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This playbook outlines the process to identify owners of public resources, determine who may have accessed those while they were exposed, determine impact of revoking access to the resource, and determine root cause of public accessibility.
PubliclyAccessibleThroughout the execution of the playbook, focus on the *desired outcomes*, taking notes for enhancement of incident response capabilities.
AWS Cloud Adoption Framework Security Perspective

***The response steps follow the Incident Response Life Cycle from NIST Special Publication 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
***
This playbook references and integrates, where possible, with Prowler which is a command line tool that helps you with AWS security assessment, auditing, hardening and incident response.
It follows guidelines of the CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark (49 checks) and has more than 100 additional checks including related to GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, ISO-27001, FFIEC, SOC2 and others.
This tool provides a rapid snapshot of the current state of security within a customer environment. As an alternative, AWS Security Hub provides for automated compliance scanning and can integrate with Prowler
Identify all existing resources and have an updated asset inventory list coupled with who owns each
aws rds describe-db-instances --region us-east-1 --query 'DBInstances[*].[DBInstanceIdentifier,ReadReplicaDBInstanceIdentifiers]'./prowler -c extra735./prowler -c extra739./prowler -c extra747./prowler -c extra7131./prowler -c extra7132./prowler -g group13What training is in place for analysts within the company to become familiar with AWS API (command-line environment), S3, RDS, and other AWS services?
Opportunities here for Threat Detection and incident response include:
AWS RE:INFORCE
Self-Service Security Assessment
Which roles are able to make changes to services within your account?Which users have those roles assigned to them? Is least privilege being followed, or do super admin users exist?Has a Security Assessment been performed against your environment, do you have a known baseline to detect "new" or "suspicious" things?What technology is used within the team/company to communicate issues? Is there anything automated?
Telephone
AWS SES
AWS SNS
Slack
Chime
Other?
AWS Config has several managed rules to evaluate your RDS instances
./prowler -c extra78./prowler -c extra723./prowler -c extra769./prowler -g group17Who is monitoring the logs/alerts, receiving them and acting upon each?Who gets notified when an alert is discovered?When do public relations and legal get involved in the process?When would you reach out to AWS Support for help?It is highly recommended to export logs to a security incident event management (SIEM) solution (such as Splunk, ELK stack, etc.) to aide in viewing and analyzing a variety of logs for a more complete attack timeline analysis.
Event HistoryRead-Only to Event NameModifyDBInstance, ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute, or ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute and look for the value PubliclyAccessible events from public IP addressesVPC Flow Logs is a feature that enables you to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC. This can be useful for IP addresses discovered within CloudTrail to determine the types of external connections to any public resources.
For further information and steps, including querying with Athena, please refer to the AWS Documentation for VPC Flow Logs. It is recommended that Athena analysis be included in a separate playbook and linked to other relavent items.
Review EC2 operating system and application logs for inappropriate logins, installation of unknown software, or the presence of unrecognized files.
It is highly recommended to have a third-party host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) solution (such as OSSEC, Tripwire, Wazuh, Amazon Inspector, other)
When you launch a DB instance inside a VPC, the DB instance has a private IP address for traffic inside the VPC. This private IP address isn’t publicly accessible. You can use the Public access option to designate whether the DB instance also has a public IP address in addition to the private IP address.
The following illustration shows the Public access option in the Additional connectivity configuration section. To set the option, open the Additional connectivity configuration section in the Connectivity section.

Delete any unrecognized or unauthorized public snapshots or databases
Same procedures as those listed for Eradication
./prowler -g group13Enforce Mandatory RDS Encryption
AWS Config has multiple automated rules to protect against public access including rds-snapshots-public-prohibited
Execute a Self-Service Security Assessment against the environment to further identify other risks and potentially other public exposure not identified throughout this playbook.
This is a place to add items specific to your company that do not necessarilly need "fixing", but are important to know when executing this playbook in tandem with operational and business requirements.