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This playbook outlines the process to identify owners of public resources, determine who may have accessed those while they were exposed, determine impact of revoking access to the resource, and determine root cause of public accessibility.
GetPublicAccessBlock, DeletePublicAccessBlock, GetObjectAcl, PutObjectAclThroughout the execution of the playbook, focus on the *desired outcomes*, taking notes for enhancement of incident response capabilities.
AWS Cloud Adoption Framework Security Perspective

***The response steps follow the Incident Response Life Cycle from NIST Special Publication 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
***
This playbook references and integrates, where possible, with Prowler which is a command line tool that helps you with AWS security assessment, auditing, hardening and incident response.
It follows guidelines of the CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark (49 checks) and has more than 100 additional checks including related to GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, ISO-27001, FFIEC, SOC2 and others.
This tool provides a rapid snapshot of the current state of security within a customer environment. Additionally, AWS Security Hub provides for automated compliance scanning and can integrate with Prowler
Identify all existing resources and have an updated asset inventory list coupled with who owns each
aws s3api list-buckets --query "Buckets[].Name"./prowler -c extra718./prowler -c extra725Option A
aws s3 ls s3://your_bucket_name --recursive
Option B
What training is in place for analysts within the company to become familiar with AWS API (command-line environment), S3, RDS, and other AWS services?
Opportunities here for Threat Detection and incident response include:
AWS RE:INFORCE
Self-Service Security Assessment
Which roles are able to make changes to services within your account?Which users have those roles assigned to them? Is least privilege being followed, or do super admin users exist?Has a Security Assessment been performed against your environment, do you have a known baseline to detect "new" or "suspicious" things?What technology is used within the team/company to communicate issues? Is there anything automated?
Telephone
AWS SES
AWS SNS
Slack
Chime
Other?
./prowler -c check26./prowler -c extra73./prowler -c extra769./prowler -g group17Who is monitoring the logs/alerts, receiving them and acting upon each?Who gets notified when an alert is discovered?When do public relations and legal get involved in the process?When would you reach out to AWS Support for help?It is highly recommended to export logs to a security incident event management (SIEM) solution (such as Splunk, ELK stack, etc.) to aide in viewing and analyzing a variety of logs for a more complete attack timeline analysis.
By default, CloudTrail logs API calls that were made in the last 90 days, but not log requests made to objects. You can see bucket-level events on the CloudTrail console. However, you can’t view data events (Amazon S3 object-level calls) there—you must parse or query CloudTrail logs for them.
Event HistoryRead-Only to Event NameGetPublicAccessBlock and DeletePublicAccessBlockYou can also get CloudTrail logs for object-level Amazon S3 actions. To do this, enable data events for your S3 bucket or all buckets in your account. When an object-level action occurs in your account, CloudTrail evaluates your trail settings. If the event matches the object that you specified in a trail, the event is logged.
Event HistoryRead-Only to Event NameGetObjectAcl and PutObjectAclVPC Flow Logs is a feature that enables you to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC. This can be useful for IP addresses discovered within CloudTrail to determine the types of external connections to any public resources.
For further information and steps, including querying with Athena, please refer to the AWS Documentation for VPC Flow Logs. It is recommended that Athena analysis be included in a separate playbook and linked to other relavent items.
Event HistoryRead-Only to Event NamePutObject and DeleteObject requests from public IP addressesReview EC2 operating system and application logs for inappropriate logins, installation of unknown software, or the presence of unrecognized files.
It is highly recommended to have a third-party host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) solution (such as OSSEC, Tripwire, Wazuh, Amazon Inspector, other)
aws s3api put-public-access-block –bucket bucket-name-here –public-access-block-configuration “BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true”
You can also review Blocking public access to your Amazon S3 storage for additional details on blocking public S3 access across your account.
Remove any unrecognized objects from buckets
Same procedures as those listed for Eradication
Encryption
./prowler -c extra734Disaster Recovery
./prowler -c extra763Prevent Users from Modifying S3 Block Public Access Settings
Regularly review bucket access and policies on a monthly basis and utilize CloudWatch Events or Security Hub for automated detections
Using versioning in S3 buckets to mitigate accidental or intentional deletion of top level objects
Managing access with ACLs to limit unauthorized access to resources on a bucket and object level
AWS Config has multiple automated rules to protect against public access including s3-bucket-level-public-access-prohibited.
Execute a Self-Service Security Assessment against the environment to further identify other risks and potentially other public exposure not identified throughout this playbook.
This is a place to add items specific to your company that do not need "fixing", but are important to know when executing this playbook in tandem with operational and business requirements.