apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: s3-encrypted-file-demo
  # setup.sh fills in the namespace, the placeholders below and the
  # sandbox.amazonaws.com/policy annotation at apply time. The policy annotation is one
  # long base64 string, so it is never kept in this file; the rendered pod setup.sh applies
  # is written to the repository's tmp/.
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: s3-encrypted-file-demo
    app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: s3-encrypted-file
  annotations:
    # The pod decrypts and exits, and its logs are the result the page reads. Auto Mode's
    # node consolidation would otherwise be free to remove the node under it, taking the
    # finished pod and its logs with it.
    karpenter.sh/do-not-disrupt: "true"
spec:
  # Confidential mode treats the node as untrusted. It is what binds key release to the
  # Cedar policy this pod carries: the guest measures that policy into PCR17, and the KMS
  # key policy releases the data key only for the measurement it was set to expect.
  runtimeClassName: confidential-sandbox
  serviceAccountName: s3-encrypted-file-pod
  # Pinned by the generated policy, so it stays the same for the approved pod and for the
  # changed pod: the only pinned difference between them is SAMPLE_VARIANT.
  hostname: s3-encrypted-file-demo
  automountServiceAccountToken: false
  enableServiceLinks: false
  # The application decrypts, validates and exits. Never restarting is what makes its
  # terminal phase the result: Succeeded for the approved pod, Failed for the one KMS
  # refuses. Both stay for inspection afterwards.
  restartPolicy: Never
  terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 0
  securityContext:
    # Numeric ids, matching the image's USER, so the generator can pin the identity
    # exactly; supplementalGroupsPolicy: Strict keeps the image's own group list out of it.
    runAsUser: 65534
    runAsGroup: 65534
    runAsNonRoot: true
    supplementalGroupsPolicy: Strict
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  containers:
    - name: main
      # The application image in the sample's ECR repository. The generated policy pins
      # this image by digest, so the pod runs this build of this code or nothing.
      image: <APP_IMAGE_URI>
      imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
      # Every value here is pinned by the generated Cedar policy, which is measured into
      # PCR17 and therefore part of what KMS checks. That is what makes the expected length
      # and digest trustworthy to the application: an operator who changes either of them,
      # to make the pod accept a different file, changes the measurement and the data key
      # is not released at all.
      env:
        # Both names, set to the same Region, on purpose. With only AWS_REGION declared,
        # the EKS Pod Identity webhook leaves out the AWS_DEFAULT_REGION it would otherwise
        # inject, while a policy generated with --with-pod-identity still expects it in the
        # pinned environment, and the guest then refuses to create the container.
        - name: AWS_REGION
          value: <AWS_REGION>
        - name: AWS_DEFAULT_REGION
          value: <AWS_REGION>
        - name: S3_BUCKET
          value: <S3_BUCKET>
        - name: S3_MANIFEST_KEY
          value: <S3_MANIFEST_KEY>
        # The full key ARN, not an alias: the application names the key it expects in the
        # Decrypt call and refuses an answer from any other key.
        - name: KMS_KEY_ARN
          value: <KMS_KEY_ARN>
        - name: EXPECTED_SHA256
          value: <EXPECTED_SHA256>
        - name: EXPECTED_LENGTH
          value: "<EXPECTED_LENGTH>"
        # The one pinned value scripts/changed-pod.sh changes. The application only prints
        # it; what matters is that the policy pins it, so changing it changes PCR17.
        - name: SAMPLE_VARIANT
          value: approved
      securityContext:
        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
        readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
        capabilities:
          drop:
            - ALL
      # This pod sets requests, where most samples here set none. The application imports
      # boto3 and cryptography, generates a 4096-bit RSA key for the attestation document,
      # and holds the file in memory, which does not fit the small default VM. Requests
      # only, and no limits: a sandbox is sized from its requests, so a limit above the
      # request would not give the VM any more room.
      resources:
        requests:
          cpu: "1"
          memory: 512Mi