Enterprise SSO

AI-DLC can authenticate users through one or more external OpenID Connect (OIDC) or SAML 2.0 identity providers. Amazon Cognito remains the federation broker and the only JWT issuer, so every backend continues to validate the same token format regardless of where the user authenticated.

Authentication model

The three authentication modes are:

These endpoints and systems have different responsibilities:

GitHub OAuth is not an enterprise login provider in this release. GitHub and GitLab OAuth remain source-control integrations; enterprise login requires an OIDC or SAML identity provider.

The application callback is <application-url>/auth/callback. The upstream IdP callback is the oidc_idp_callback_url output for OIDC or the saml_acs_url output for SAML. Do not interchange them.

AI-DLC does not automatically link a federated identity to an existing local identity, and matching email addresses must not be assumed to merge accounts. Platform logout clears the AI-DLC/Cognito session but does not perform global IdP logout. An upstream IdP can therefore reuse its browser session on the next login. AI-DLC does not implement upstream account switching for any provider; there are no provider-specific exceptions. OIDC logout and SAML Single Logout have different contracts and cannot provide one portable behavior. Users who must change their enterprise identity should use the IdP's own account-switch/sign-out flow or an isolated browser profile.

Role and access mapping

Provider configuration can map exact, case-sensitive values from one external claim to platform roles. This release supports platform-admin; future roles are added centrally in config/platform-roles.json.

For a federated user:

• The external claim is authoritative on every fresh federated sign-in.
• Cognito group membership is replaced in the issued token by the mapped roles. Manually adding a federated user to platform-admin does not grant that role.
• Cognito requires mapped claims to use app-client-writable attributes. Hosted SSO sessions omit Cognito's self-service scope, so federated users cannot modify the stored role claim through UpdateUserAttributes.
• requiredClaimValues is an optional, independent access gate. When configured, every user, including an administrator, must have at least one required value.
• Role and access changes at the IdP take effect after platform logout and a new federated sign-in. Refresh tokens are valid for one day in SSO-enabled modes.
• The Admin user list marks these roles Managed by <provider> and read-only.

Local Cognito users keep their normal Cognito groups. In sso-only mode, the installer does not create a local administrator and deployment validation requires at least one configured platform-admin mapping. That validation cannot prove that a real person is assigned, so verify an SSO administrator in hybrid mode before switching to sso-only.

Project membership is assigned to the Cognito broker identity, not to an email address or upstream username. A federated user must complete one successful sign-in before appearing in Project Settings → Members. The member picker labels local Cognito accounts separately from enterprise identities and excludes identities that are disabled or do not pass the configured access gate.

Bootstrap sequence

The Cognito federation domain must exist before an upstream redirect URI can be registered. Use the managed installer to create a local-authentication deployment first. Download the installer as described in Setup, then run:

bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh install \
  --profile <aws-profile> \
  --region <aws-region> \
  --environment <environment> \
  --admin <administrator-email>

The installation summary prints the OIDC callback, SAML ACS, and SAML entity ID to register with the external provider. The status command prints them again:

bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh status

Configure the provider, store any OIDC client secret in AWS Secrets Manager, and write a provider file such as /tmp/aidlc-sso.json. Reconfigure the installed release in hybrid mode first so the local administrator remains available while the external role mapping is verified:

bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh update \
  --version <current-version> \
  --auth-mode hybrid \
  --sso-config /tmp/aidlc-sso.json

Provider configuration is persisted as a mode-0600 <environment>.sso.tfvars.json file. It contains only the Secrets Manager ARN, never the OIDC client secret. Use --no-sso on a later update to return to local authentication. Moving from sso-only back to local/hybrid prompts for and creates a local administrator.

After an SSO administrator has signed in successfully, the same provider file can be moved to SSO-only mode:

bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh update \
  --version <current-version> \
  --auth-mode sso-only \
  --sso-config /tmp/aidlc-sso.json

Provider file

One file can contain multiple OIDC and SAML providers:

{
  "providers": [
    {
      "name": "CorporateOIDC",
      "displayName": "Corporate identity",
      "type": "oidc",
      "issuerUrl": "https://idp.example.com",
      "clientId": "client-id",
      "clientSecretArn": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:REGION:ACCOUNT:secret:NAME",
      "scopes": ["openid", "email", "profile"],
      "claims": {
        "email": "email",
        "name": "name",
        "roles": "groups"
      },
      "roleMappings": {
        "platform-admin": ["aidlc-admin"]
      },
      "requiredClaimValues": ["aidlc-user"]
    }
  ]
}

name is the stable Cognito provider identifier and must start with a letter, contain at most 32 letters/numbers/underscores/hyphens, and not be COGNITO. displayName is shown on the login button. Provider names must remain stable: renaming one creates distinct federated Cognito usernames.

Create one Secrets Manager secret per OIDC provider in the same AWS account and Region as the AI-DLC deployment. The secret name is your choice; the examples use aidlc/<environment>/<provider-name>. Store the raw OIDC client secret itself, not a JSON wrapper:

printf '%s' '<oidc-client-secret>' > /tmp/aidlc-oidc-secret
chmod 600 /tmp/aidlc-oidc-secret

aws secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name "aidlc/<environment>/<provider-name>" \
  --secret-string file:///tmp/aidlc-oidc-secret \
  --profile <aws-profile> \
  --region <aws-region> \
  --query ARN --output text

Copy the returned ARN into that provider's clientSecretArn field, then remove the temporary file. The installer does not require or look up a fixed secret name. Its AWS principal needs secretsmanager:GetSecretValue for the ARN.

Terraform must send the secret value to the Cognito identity-provider API, so the value can be present in Terraform state even though configuration files contain only its ARN. Protect the state backend and restrict access to it.

Microsoft Entra ID (OIDC)

Using Entra app roles avoids group-overage behavior and gives tokens stable, application-specific values.

1. In Microsoft Entra admin center, open App registrations and create an app registration for AI-DLC in the required tenant.

2. Under Authentication, add a Web redirect URI equal to the OIDC callback shown by bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh status.

3. Under Certificates & secrets, create a client secret. Store its Value immediately as the raw value of a Secrets Manager secret in the deployment account and Region, for example aidlc/<environment>/entra. The Secret ID is not the client secret. Set clientSecretArn below to the ARN returned by Secrets Manager.

4. Under App roles, create roles with values AI-DLC.User and AI-DLC.Admin. Allow users/groups, then assign users or groups through the corresponding Enterprise application. Administrators need both roles.
5. Under Token configuration, add the email optional claim to the ID token. Confirm assigned users actually receive a valid email value.
6. Record the Application (client) ID and tenant ID. Use the tenant-specific v2 issuer, not common or organizations.

Example:

{
  "providers": [
    {
      "name": "Entra",
      "displayName": "Microsoft Entra ID",
      "type": "oidc",
      "issuerUrl": "https://login.microsoftonline.com/<tenant-id>/v2.0",
      "clientId": "<application-client-id>",
      "clientSecretArn": "<secrets-manager-arn>",
      "scopes": ["openid", "email", "profile"],
      "claims": {
        "email": "email",
        "name": "name",
        "roles": "roles"
      },
      "roleMappings": {
        "platform-admin": ["AI-DLC.Admin"]
      },
      "requiredClaimValues": ["AI-DLC.User"]
    }
  ]
}

If your tenant uses group claims instead, set claims.roles to groups and map Entra group object IDs. Review Entra group-overage behavior before relying on that approach; users in many groups may receive an overage indicator instead of the complete group list.

Okta (OIDC)

1. In Okta Admin Console, open Applications, create an OIDC - OpenID Connect integration, choose Web Application, and enable Authorization Code.
2. Set the sign-in redirect URI to the OIDC callback shown by bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh status. Assign the application only to users/groups allowed to use it.
3. Create Okta groups aidlc-user and aidlc-admin; administrators should be members of both.
4. Under Security → API → Authorization Servers, open the authorization server used by the app (commonly default). Under Access Policies, add an active policy assigned to the AI-DLC client and a rule that permits the Authorization Code grant for assigned users and the requested scopes.
5. In the same authorization server, add a groups claim with value type Groups. Include it in ID tokens for any scope (or for every scope listed in the provider file), and filter it to the groups intended for AI-DLC, such as names matching ^aidlc-. Use Token Preview with an assigned AI-DLC user and confirm the ID token contains the exact, case-sensitive group names. If the Okta tenant instead presents an expression-based Token claims UI, name the claim groups and use: user.getGroups({"group.profile.name":"aidlc-","operator":"STARTS_WITH"}).![name]. The claim name must match claims.roles; aidlc-* is not wildcard syntax in this expression.
6. Copy the client ID and secret. Store the raw secret in the deployment account and Region, for example as aidlc/<environment>/okta, and set clientSecretArn below to the ARN returned by Secrets Manager.
7. Copy the exact issuer shown by Okta. For the default custom authorization server it normally ends in /oauth2/default.

Example:

{
  "providers": [
    {
      "name": "Okta",
      "displayName": "Okta",
      "type": "oidc",
      "issuerUrl": "https://<okta-domain>/oauth2/default",
      "clientId": "<okta-client-id>",
      "clientSecretArn": "<secrets-manager-arn>",
      "scopes": ["openid", "email", "profile"],
      "claims": {
        "email": "email",
        "name": "name",
        "roles": "groups"
      },
      "roleMappings": {
        "platform-admin": ["aidlc-admin"]
      },
      "requiredClaimValues": ["aidlc-user"]
    }
  ]
}

Use the claim preview/token preview in Okta to verify email, name, and groups before deploying. Claim configuration differs between the org authorization server and custom authorization servers; the issuer and claim must come from the same server.

Okta app assignment and app sign-on policies are separate from authorization server access policies. If the System Log shows the app sign-on evaluation as ALLOW but the OAuth authorization request fails with no_matching_policy, add or correct the access policy and rule on the authorization server selected by issuerUrl.

Generic SAML 2.0

Run bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh status and register AI-DLC as a SAML service provider using the reported SAML ACS and SAML entity values.

Set:

• ACS / Reply URL to the reported SAML ACS
• Audience / SP Entity ID to the reported SAML entity
• NameID to a stable user identifier, normally email
• Attribute statements for email, display name, and role/group values

The provider file accepts exactly one metadata source: HTTPS URL, local file, or inline XML. Local metadata paths are resolved relative to the JSON file.

{
  "providers": [
    {
      "name": "CorporateSAML",
      "displayName": "Corporate SAML",
      "type": "saml",
      "metadata": {
        "file": "./idp-metadata.xml"
      },
      "claims": {
        "email": "urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3",
        "name": "urn:oid:2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.241",
        "roles": "https://aidlc.example.com/claims/groups"
      },
      "roleMappings": {
        "platform-admin": ["aidlc-admin"]
      },
      "requiredClaimValues": ["aidlc-user"]
    }
  ]
}

For hosted metadata use "metadata": {"url": "https://..."}. For inline metadata use "metadata": {"xml": "<EntityDescriptor ...>"}. Attribute names must exactly match the names in the SAML assertion. AI-DLC does not initiate SAML Single Logout.

Troubleshooting

Provider button is missing. Run bash /tmp/aidlc-install.sh status and confirm the expected authentication mode and provider names. Rerun the installer update if the previous deployment did not complete.

Redirect URI mismatch. OIDC uses the OIDC callback reported by the installer, not the application /auth/callback. SAML uses the reported SAML ACS.

Federated user is denied. Inspect the IdP token/assertion and compare its role claim values, including case, with requiredClaimValues. A mapped admin role does not bypass the access gate.

Role change is not visible. Platform logout and start a new provider login. An existing Cognito refresh token does not fetch fresh external claims.

OIDC provider creation fails. Confirm the issuer exposes standard OIDC discovery, the secret contains only the raw client secret, and Terraform can read the supplied Secrets Manager ARN using the installer’s AWS credentials.